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Abstract
Data retention is a relatively new phenomena. Due to the impact of 9/11
data retention became an important tool, according to governments, against
terrorists and other criminals. Telecommunication service providers are ob-
liged to retain non content data about the communications of its clients for
a certain period of time. Law enforcement authorities may access this data
after complying with certain requirements. However, data retention strongly
interferes with fundamental rights, mainly the respect for private and family
life and protection of personal data. The Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) has declared that existing data retention schemes are contrary
to EU law. This analysis tries to clarify how data retention could be carried
out in accordance with fundamental rights. It assesses the relevant case law
from the CJEU, the applicable legal framework and data retention systems of
other jurisdictions in order to determine parameters which are important for
the future development of this investigation tool.
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Introduction
0.1 From Beccaria to Data Retention
«Falsa idea di utilità è quella che sacrifica mille vantaggi reali per un
inconveniente o immaginario o di poca conseguenza, che
toglierebbe agli uomini il fuoco perché incendia e l’acqua perché
annega, che non ripara ai mali che col distruggere.»
Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764)
In the 18th century, Cesare Beccaria, in his most famous work Dei delitti e delle
pene, stated how a modern, rational criminal law would look like. Everyone should
be guaranteed a due process of law, punishments ought to be proportionate and
everyone should be treated innocent until proven guilty.
Sure enough Beccarias work had great influence on criminal law in continental
Europe and beyond. Nowadays, a great number of jurists defend a humanistic
point of view when it comes to criminal law: Offenders should be reintegrated into
society and should spend their prison time preparing for it. Also, laws ought to be
proportional and not draconian, as everyone could face a criminal trial. However,
apart from legal scholars, lawyers, judges and other jurists, these ideas from the age
of Enlightenment were not received in the same way.
All kind of media, for example, preaches ideas directly opposed to the values
Beccaria established. Frequently, we read headlines suggesting that a robber, a thief,
a murderer and others should face heavier jail sentences, ought to be locked up for
the maximum time possible, some even calling for the reintroduction of the death
penalty. Politicians, too, praise this mantra as it seems to be a promising strategy
to gain votes in the next elections and to establish themselves as someone who
guarantees security.
Theses considerations are essential for understanding how anti-terror legislation
unfolded after 9/11. When, back in September 2001, the twin towers fell, a new era
of military and security policies began. The United States legislators approved of
the Patriot Act and the United States Government went as far as installing camps
like Guantánamo where, according to some reports, torture was commonplace. The
War on Terror had begun.
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The Madrid Bombings of 2004 and the London Bombings of 2005 were to
reassure European countries that they are facing international terrorism, too. Under
these impressions, in 2006 theEuropeanUnion adopted theDataRetentionDirective,
an instrument which had to be transposed into the national legislation of every
Member State of the European Union.
Its objective was to prevent and to help investigating serious crimes, such as ter-
rorism. To achieve this goal, the text set out that the operators of telecommunication
services1 had to retain the traffic data for a certain period of time. Traffic data gen-
erally means all data except for the content of the communication. For example, the
data retained from a cellphone call would be the duration of the connection, which
phones (identified by a unique serial number called IMEI) are communicating, the
cellphone numbers, its owners and the location of the two phones. The content of
the conversation would not be recorded.
Data retention also applied to other services such as internet access or SMS, and
in general to every type of telecommunication service. Law enforcement authorities
could then request access to the withheld data. Various Constitutional or Supreme
Courts of European States declared that their national legislation, implementing the
Data Retention Directive, fell short of respecting fundamental rights.
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Digital Rights
Ireland declared that the Data Retention Directive from 2006 did not comply with
other European Union law and was in breach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union. The Directive was declared invalid. Two years later, in
2016, the Court of Justice also found that the national legislation, regarding data
retention in Sweden and England, were not respecting the provisions of European
Union (EU) law, referring once again to fundamental rights as a justification.
The judges followed the argument that data retention as foreseen in the Data
Retention Directive of 2006 is a method were every single person using telecommu-
nications services is placed under constant surveillance. This approach was rejected
as it does not conform to fundamental rights. However, the Court of Justice of
the European Union left the door open for data retention if it complies with the
requirements set out in its decisions.
Usual arguments against data retention are that placing everyone under sur-
1This text uses telecommunication service providers and communication service providers in-
distinctly.
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veillance is interfering with the rights to intimacy, privacy, data protection and
consequently the unhindered development of human personality. It would also have
a chilling effect on freedom of speech. Finally, it could harm democratic institutions,
as a result of limiting or interfering with fundamental rights, such as freedom of
speech.
Arguments brought forward for data retention are usually more utilitarian: This
is to say that these arguments are focussing on specific goals and that data retention
is a mean to achieve these goals. The end justifies the means, one may say. From
this perspective data retention is necessary for the fight against serious crime, for
example, terrorism, child pornography or narcotrafficking. This would legitimate
data retention, as society is striving for security and is not tolerating these offences.
This brings us back to Cesare Beccaria. When he, back in his days, stated that
laws should not be draconian, but should be proportionate and tried to convince
his fellows that living in liberty is the best condition for human beings, he most
surely, I may argue, would have been astonished on how we treat our liberties today.
Hence, the aim of this thesis is to clarify how data retention could be carried out in
accordance with fundamental rights.
0.2 Research questions
In this thesis we will address telecommunication data retention, focussing mainly
on its public aspect and regulation in the European Union. Telecommunication data
retention for private purposes will also be mentioned, although only briefly.
1. How is data retention and access to retained data shaped and conditioned by
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union?
2. Beyond the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and
the applicable legal framework: which options and models for data retention
and access are plausible?
3. Have any of the suggested options for question two or any alternative sys-
tem proved anywhere to fulfil the principle of proportionality and to respect
fundamental rights?
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0.3 Structure
The first chapter will be dedicated to data retention2 and access by authorities to
this data from a negative perspective. We will discuss the now invalidated Data
Retention Directive and what data was retained, for how long, as well as some
applicable guarantees. Furthermore, we will review the Digital Rights Ireland,
the Tele2 and the Ministerio Fiscal judgements from the Court of Justice of the
European Union and the following limitations for national and European Union
legislation. This implies exploring the underlying discussion between surveillance
and fundamental rights.
In the second chapter we will focus on data retention and access by authorities
from a positive perspective. This is to say that the second chapter outlines how future
data retention could be realised, taking into account all the necessary limitations set
out in the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union as explained in
the first chapter. Also, we will refer to the principles of the European Union General
Data Protection Regulation. Further, we will discuss the notion of the «quick freeze»
system, which has been discussed as an alternative to the classical approach of data
retention.
In the third chapter we take a look at some specific jurisdictions: the United
States, Australia, Austria and Canada. Wewill compare the systems of data retention
operating in these states, focussing on the legal framework in each jurisdiction, its
principles and possible criticism. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the
systems by the standards found to be relevant in the foregoing chapter in order to
identify practical problems, alternatives and undesirable attributes of data retention
schemes.
Finally, we will conclude answering the research questions, trying to summarize
how data retention would ideally work in view of the test of proportionality. We
will also state some questions that remain unanswered and need further analysis in
the future.
2The term data retention is used in a broad sense in this text. It does also cover data preservation.
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Chapter 1
The Limits of Data Retention
1.1 The Data Retention Directive
1.1.1 Origin
As outlined in the introduction (see supra 0.1) the European Union Data Retention
Directive1 was adopted as a part of new security policies against international ter-
rorism, due to the impact of the terrorist attacks suffered in New York, London and
Madrid.2 As stated in the recitals of the directive, the use of electronic communica-
tion was growing significantly, making it, therefore, necessary to gain access to data
related to electronic communications for «[...]the prevention, investigation, detec-
tion and prosecution of criminal offences, in particular organised crime»,3 especially
citing the fight against terrorism.4
1.1.2 Content and Traffic Data
The Data Retention Directive’s core provision was the obligation of «providers of
publicly available electronic communications services or of a public communica-
tions network»5 to retain traffic data for a period between six months and two years.6
This traffic data of telephone and internet connections consists of data necessary to
identify the source, the destination, date, time, duration and type of a communica-
tion, as well as the users’ equipment and the users location.7 Content data, however,
1Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: https:
//data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/24/oj, visited on 1st February 2019.
2Møller Pedersen, Anja, Udsen, Henrik and Sandfeld Jakobsen, Søren (2018). “Data retention
in Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”. In: International Data Privacy Law 8 (2). Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx026, visited on 27th November 2018, p. 160.
3Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, recital 7.
4Ibid., recitals 8-10.
5Ibid., article 3.
6Ibid., article 6.
7Ibid., article 5(1).
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should not be retained.8 The scope of application of this provisions is broad: the
directive applies to data of both natural and legal persons,9 «[...]without distinguish-
ing between criminal suspects and ordinary citizens»10 and extends data retention
to all communication service providers in the European Union.11 However, the data
gained through this retention may only be used «[...]for the purpose of the investig-
ation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State
in its national law.»12
1.1.3 Retention and Access
The Data Retention Directive distinguished the logging of traffic data, known as
retention, and the access by authorities to this logged data. The Directive imposed
the obligation to retain traffic data: this should be regulated in a similar way in
the whole European Union.13 Access by authorities to the retained data, however,
needed to be regulated by each Member State.14
The Court of Justice of the European Union also applies this difference and treats
retention and access as two different subjects (see infra 1.2).
1.1.4 Controversies
The Data Retention Directive has been described as a directive which «[...]met with
significant controversy[...]»15 from the beginning of its existence.16 Unsurprisingly,
8Ibid., article 5(2).
9Ibid., article 1(2).
10Vedaschi, Arianna and Lubello, Valerio (2015). “Data Retention and its Implications for
the Fundamental Right to Privacy”. In: Tilburg Law Review 20 (1). Available at: http://
booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/22112596-02001005,
visited on 27th November 2018, p. 20.
11Ibid., p. 19.
12Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 1(1).
13Ibid., article 3(1).
14Ibid., article 4.
15Fennelly, David (2018). “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”. In: ERA
Forum. issn: 1863-9038. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-018-0516-5,
visited on 27th November 2018, p. 2.
16González Pascual, Maribel (2014). “El TJUE como garante de los Derechos en la UE a la
luz de la sentencia Digital Rights Ireland”. In: Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 49.
issn: 1138-4026. Available at: http://www.cepc.gob.es/publicaciones/revistas/
revistaselectronicas?IDR=4&IDN=1336&IDA=37257, visited on 27th March 2019, p. 944.
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it faced different legal challenges: Ireland brought proceedings before the CJEU
considering that the legal basis for the adoption of the Directive was inappropriate;
according to Fabbrini, the Irish challenge was not concerned with the interference of
data retention with fundamental rights, but rather with the unwillingness to raise the
standards of its own system of data retention.17 The CJEU rejected this claim,18 stat-
ing that the legal basis—adopting the directive «as an internal market measure»19—
was indeed the correct one.20 Also, in several Member States of the European Union
the national implementation of the Directive was challenged before the courts: some
examples are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, Germany and the Czech Republic. The
Constitutional Court of Romania, for example, declared that the national data re-
tention legislation fell short of protecting the right to respect for private and family
life,21whereas theGermanBundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
referred to its own constitution and the secrecy of correspondence in its judgement.
In general, these judgements partly anticipate the decision of the CJEU.22
Finally, an Irish and an Austrian case made their way to the CJEU, each one
through a reference for a preliminary ruling, essentially asking about the validity of
the Data Retention Directive in view of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. The CJEU delivered its decision on 8th April 2014 in what is
known as the Digital Rights Ireland case.23 It declares the Data Retention Directive
invalid.
17Fabbrini, Federico (2015a). “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of
Justice Ruling in the Data Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United
States”. In: Harvard Human Rights Journal 28. Available at: https://harvardhrj.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2009/09/human-rights-in-the-digital-age.pdf, visited
on 10th May 2019, pp. 75-76.
18Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 10 February 2009, Ireland v European Parliament
and Council of the EU, C-301/06. ECLI:EU:C:2009:68.
19Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 6.
20Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, pp. 75-76.
21European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms). Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680063765, visited on 1st February 2019, article 8.
22For more details about the national judgements: Vedaschi and Lubello, “Data Retention and its
Implications for the Fundamental Right to Privacy”, pp. 22-26.
23Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12. ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
11
1.2. CJEU Jurisprudence
1.2 CJEU Jurisprudence
1.2.1 Digital Rights Ireland
The questions referred to the CJEU originated in the Irish High Court and the
Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court).24 In Ireland Digital Rights
Ireland Ltd claimed that the national legislation and the Data Retention Directive
were not legal.25 In Austria the Kärntner Landesregierung (the Government of the
State of Carinthia) and 11130 other applicants challenged the legislative changes
stemming from the transposition of the Directive as interfering with their right to
data protection.26 The CJEU joined both cases27 and deduced that «[...]the referring
courts are essentially asking the Court to examine the validity of Directive 2006/24
in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter.»28
At the beginning of its reasoning the Court already makes an decisive move
when it states that traffic data may allow for very specific deductions:
«Those data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions
to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data
has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or
temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities
carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social
environments frequented by them.»29
Fabbrini argues that through this decision «[...]the ECJ showed awareness of the
pervasive effect of a metadata collection program[...]»,30 citing an National Security
Agency (NSA) responsible who praises the utility of traffic data.
The obligation for retention introduced by the Data Retention Directive amends
24Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 8.
25Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 17.
26Ibid., para. 19.
27Ibid., para. 22.
28Ibid., para. 23.
29Ibid., para. 27.
30Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, p. 86.
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the data protection regime foreseen in theData ProtectionDirective31 from1995—as
of May 2018 repealed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)32— and
the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive33 from 2002, «[...]directives
which provided for the confidentiality of communications and of traffic data[...].»34
Moreover, the Court considers, according to its case law: «To establish the
existence of an interference with the fundamental right to privacy, it does not matter
whether the information on the private lives concerned is sensitive or whether the
persons concerned have been inconvenienced in any way[...].»35
The CJEU then determined, in light of the foregoing consideration, that the
Directive constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private and family
life and the right to protection of personal data, as enshrined by article 7 and 8
of the Charter36, 37 because «[...]data relating to a person’s private life and to his
communications[...]»38 is retained and access may be granted to authorities.39, 40
It may also affect the right to freedom of expression, having a chilling effect, even
though data retention does not affect content data.41, 42
The Court subsequently proceeds to examine the interference of the rights guar-
anteed by the Charter according to the test of proportionality. In general, the
31Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: https:
//data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1995/46/oj, visited on 1st February 2019.
32Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at:
https://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj, visited on 1st February 2019.
33Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: https:
//data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj, visited on 1st February 2019.
34Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 32.
35Ibid., para. 33.
36Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion. Available at: https://data.europa.
eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj, visited on 1st February 2019.
37Vedaschi and Lubello, “Data Retention and its Implications for the Fundamental Right to
Privacy”, p. 28.
38Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 34.
39Ibid., paras. 34-36.
40Guild, Elspeth and Carrera, Sergio (2014). “The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital
Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention Directive”. In: CEPS Liberty and Security in
Europe Papers 65. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2445901, visited on 26th April
2019, pp. 5-6.
41Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 28.
42Guild and Carrera, “The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the
Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, p. 6.
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interference of the Data Retention Directive is considered to be «wide-ranging»,
«particularly serious» and may cause the feeling of «constant surveillance»,43 as
well as entailing «[...]an interference with the fundamental rights of practically the
entire European population»,44 «[...] without any differentiation, limitation or ex-
ception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime.»45
The decision rightly states that public security is of «utmost importance», but that
it does not, therefore, justify any tool or measure to defend it:46, 47 the limitation of
the rights concerned is only admissible if «strictly necessary».48 As data retention
affects everyone using electronic communications systems, without any exceptions,
there is no direct link to be found «[...]between the data whose retention is provided
for and a threat to public security[...]».49, 50
Also, as the CJEU states, there is no sufficient regulation regarding the access
by authorities to the retained data. The decision particularly claims that there is no
«objective criterion» for access, that the Directive does not require judicial review
for access, nor does it provide any «substantive or procedural conditions» for access
by authorities.51
The Court finds that there is no sufficient regulation on the interference caused
by retention and that the interference is not limited to what is strictly necessary. 52
Therefore, the Directive does not respect the principle of proportionality.53
Digital Rights Ireland puts an end to the European Union Data Retention Direct-
ive declaring it invalid. Moreover, it implies that the Directive legally never existed,
as the effects of the judgement are ex tunc. 54 However, Directives are subject to a
43Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 37.
44Ibid., para. 56.
45Ibid., para. 57.
46Ibid., para. 51.
47Guild and Carrera, “The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the
Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, p. 7.
48Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 52.
49Ibid., para. 59.
50See also: Vedaschi and Lubello, “Data Retention and its Implications for the Fundamental
Right to Privacy”, p. 29.
51Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, paras. 60-62.
52Ibid., para. 65.
53Ibid., para. 69.
54Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 11.
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national transposition; the resulting national regulation will not be directly affected
by the invalidity of a Directive, as according to CJEU case law each Member State
has to decide about the implications of a Directive’s invalidity in its legal system
on its own. This, precisely, is the reason why data retention schemes have been
declared invalid in some Member States. Others modified or revised their data
retention schemes and in some cases data retention continued as before.55
1.2.2 Tele2
In the aftermath of the Digital Rights Ireland decision a Swedish electronic com-
munication provider called Tele2 stopped its data retention. It understood that the
national Swedish legislation did not comply with the standards set by the CJEU.56
Also, in the United Kingdom the legality of theData Retention and Investigatory
Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA), that had been enacted after the Digital Rights Ireland
judgement, 57 was called into question: Mr. Watson and others raised concerns that
DRIPAmight not be compatible with the Charter, nor with the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).58
What makes Tele2 different from the foregoing decision inDigital Rights Ireland
is the fact that what is called into question is not a European Union Directive, but
national legislation of its Member States.59
The CJEU mainly focuses on the question whether article 15 of the Privacy and
Electronic Communications Directive,60 taking into account articles 7, 8 and 52(1)
of the Charter,61 «[...]must be interpreted as precluding national legislation [...] for
general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers
and registered users with respect to all means of electronic communications.»62
55Ibid., pp. 11-12.
56Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15. ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para. 44.
57Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 12.
58Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 52.
59Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 161.
60Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
61Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
62Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 62.
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Electronic communication, including traffic data, should, as a general principle,
be confidential as outlined by article 5(1) of the Privacy and Electronic Commu-
nications Directive.63, 64 As «[...]a general rule, any person other than the users
is prohibited from storing, without the consent of the users concerned, the traffic
data related to electronic communications.»65 However, article 15(1) of the same
Directive is an important exception to the principle of confidentiality as it permits
retention or interception of content or traffic data.66
The exception provided for by article 15(1) «must be interpreted strictly» accord-
ing to CJEU case law. Moreover, the general rule foreseen in article 5 may not be
replaced or rendered void by the exception.67 As the second and the third sentence
of article 15(1) provide, national regulation may only be enacted for the objectives
set out in the first sentence and must respect the principles of European Union Law,
including the Charter.68, 69 Recalling article 52(1) of the Charter, limitations to the
rights guaranteed «[...]must be provided for by law and must respect the essence of
those rights and freedoms.»70 Any restrictions on the protection of personal data in
combination with the right to respect for private life are only permitted if they are
strictly necessary, at least at EU level and according to the case law of the CJEU.71
63Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 5(1).
64Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 164.
65Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 85.
66«Member Statesmay adopt legislativemeasures to restrict the scope of the rights and obligations
provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of this Directive when
such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic
society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic
communication system, as referred to in Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. To this end, Member
States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a limited
period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in this
paragraph shall be in accordance with the general principles of Community law, including those
referred to in Article 6(1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union», see: Directive 2002/58/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 15(1).
67Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 89.
68Ibid., paras. 90-91.
69Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 164.
70Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 94.
71Ibid., para. 96.
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The Swedish legislation provided for a «general and indiscriminate» data re-
tention scheme which retained all traffic data without any exceptions.72, 73 This is
indeed a very similar data retention scheme to the one provided in the invalidated
Data Rention Directive of 2006.74 Following the argumentation of the Advocate
General the Court affirms that this data is as sensitive as the actual content.75, 76
As in Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU states that the interference is «far-
reaching» and «particularly serious» and that the affected population might feel
«constant surveillance». Furthermore, there might be a chilling effect on the right
of freedom of expression.77 Only the fight against «serious crime» might justify
measures of serious interference with fundamental rights;78 these measures of gen-
eral interest, however, «[...]cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing
for the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data should
be considered to be necessary for the purposes of that fight.»79 The data retention
established by the Swedish legislation is the rule and not the exception because
everyone using electronic communication services is affected by this data retention
scheme, even without having any relation with ongoing criminal investigations.80, 81
Therefore, the CJEU concludes: «National legislation such as that at issue in
the main proceedings therefore exceeds the limits of what is strictly necessary and
cannot be considered to be justified, within a democratic society, as required by
Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and
Article 52(1) of the Charter.»82
However, the CJEU does not reject the idea of data retention in general: A
72Ibid., paras. 97-98.
73Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 164.
74Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
75Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 99.
76Even though traffic data is as sensitive as content data, the Court, surprisingly, finds in paragraph
101 that only content data could affect the essence of the rights concerned.
77Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, paras. 100-101.
78Ibid., para. 102.
79Ibid., para. 103.
80Ibid., paras. 104-106.
81Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 165.
82Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 107.
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Member State might enact legislation with «[...]targeted retention of traffic and
location data, for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that the retention
of data is limited, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of
communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted, to
what is strictly necessary.»83, 84
The Court then proceeds to examine a second point, if «[...]the access of the
competent national authorities to retained data, where that legislation does not
restrict that access solely to the objective of fighting serious crime, where that
access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative
authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be
retained within the European Union»85 is compatible with the Charter.
Access to the data that has been retained may only be granted if it is «genuinely
and strictly» related to one of the items listed in article 15(1)86 and this access
is only possible, in regard of the field of prosecution of criminal offences, for the
«objective of fighting serious crime» due to its serious interferencewith fundamental
rights.87, 88 It follows, that access—implying a serious interferencewith fundamental
rights— is not permissible for fighting crimes that are not serious. The access to
such data shall be reduced to what is «strictly necessary».89 Also, access must be
granted by judicial or independent administrative authorities and data must be stored
in the EU, in order to protect the enforceability of jurisdiction.90, 91
The CJEU therefore establishes that the Charter precludes «[...]access of the
competent national authorities to the retained data, where the objective pursued
by that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting
serious crime, where access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent
83Ibid., para. 108.
84See also: Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 14.
85Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 114.
86«[...]safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication
system [...]»
87Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 115.
88Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 14.
89Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 115.
90Ibid., paras. 120 and 122.
91Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 15.
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administrative authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned
should be retained within the European Union.»92
1.2.3 CJEU Competence
What remains questionable in both decisions Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 is the
scope of application of the Directives, EU law and the competence of the CJEU.
As Fennelly points out in his excellent article,93 the CJEU in Digital Rights
Ireland concludes that: «The material objective of that directive is [...] to contribute
to the fight against serious crime and [...] to public security.»94 This is surprising
because the Court had confirmed the legal basis of the Data Retention Directive to
be an internal market measure, as already stated above (see supra 1.1.4).95
Moreover, the Court deals with both retention and access in its judgement, even
though access is deliberately excluded from the Directive: It is for the Member
States to regulate the access conditions to retained data.96 This exclusion is in line
with the principle of conferral, stating that any competence that is not conferred
to the EU remains a competence of the Member States. Indeed, national security,
which might comprehend access to retained data for the investigation of crimes, is
explicitly excluded from EU competences.97
On one hand, the courts decision might look like a logical conclusion, because
retention and access go hand in hand («no access without retention») and because
the legislator should not impose interferences with fundamental rights and leave the
formulation of guarantees almost exclusively to the Member States.98 On the other
hand, these considerations are weakening the principle of conferral.99
The same is true for the Tele2 decision. It actually does not only refer to the
fact that EU law precludes national data retention legislation, it also dictates how
92Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 124.
93Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 9.
94Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 41.
95Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 10 February 2009, Ireland v European Parliament
and Council of the EU, C-301/06.
96Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 4.
97Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 16.
98Ibid., p. 8.
99Ibid., pp. 16-19.
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national data access should be regulated. It might be argued that its interpretation
of article 15(1) does extend the scope of the directive further than what is foreseen
in article 1(3) of the same Directive.100
1.2.4 Ministerio Fiscal
Ministerio Fiscal is a relatively recent decision from the CJEU delivered in October
2018.101 It is mainly concerned with access to retained data and not with data
retention itself. Its findings might be of importance for future jurisprudence on data
retention of the CJEU and in the same way for legislators and national courts.
A Spanish court referred a question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU with
the following facts: A phone had been stolen and the police, in order to clarify
the circumstances, filed a request to obtain access to the retained data about the
phone. The scope of the request was limited: the subscribers data (name, surname,
domicile and telephone number) of the SIM cards that had been activated in the
stolen phone in the first twelve days after the theft.102 The request was addressed to
the competent judge, who needs to authorize the access. In first instance, however,
the judge refused to grant access, because the crime that was being investigated, is
not qualified as a «serious crime».103 In second instance, the question was referred
to the CJEU.104
In light of the Tele2 judgement the question asked by the Audiencia Provincial
de Tarragona may have led to the Spanish data retention regime being declared
contrary to EU law.105 The Spanish data retention legislation stems, basically, from
the now invalid Data Retention Directive.106
However, the Court interpreted the scope of the question differently. It basically
100Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
101Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16.
ECLI:EU:C:2018:788.
102Ibid., para. 20.
103Ibid., para. 21.
104Ibid., para. 26.
105Rodríguez Lainz, José Luis (2018). “El Régimen Legal español en materia de conservación y
cesión de datos para la investigación de delitos. Comentario a la sentencia del TJUE de 2 de febrero
de 2018”. In: Diario La Ley 9291, pp. 6-7.
106Ley 25/2007, de 18 de octubre, de conservación de datos relativos a las comunicaciones
electrónicas y a las redes públicas de comunicaciones. Available at: https://boe.es/buscar/
act.php?id=BOE-A-2007-18243, visited on 23rd February 2019, preamble I.
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reduced the question to aspects of access. This means, essentially, that the Court did
not judge the Spanish data retention scheme, but only the access to the retained data.
Hence, what was actually being discussed was the question which are the conditions
and circumstances for gaining access to retained data.107
In Tele2 the CJEU stated that access to retained data by authorities is only legal
in cases which are considered to be «serious crimes».108 Also, the Data Retention
Directive stated the same, making it a guarantee.109 In Ministerio Fiscal, however,
the Court finds that this consideration is too strict and modifies its interpretation.
Access to retained data may be granted, even in cases where no «serious crimes»
are investigated, depending on the proportionality of the access.110 In this sense,
the Court decides that access to the subscribers data (name, surname, domicile
and telephone number) of the SIM cards activated in the phone in the first twelve
days after the theft is proportional; this data does not reveal substantial and precise
information of the affected and constitutes, therefore, no serious interference with
fundamental rights.111 In order to justify a serious interference with fundamental
rights (permitting precise conclusions about the private life of the affected), the
criminal offence being investigated must also be qualified as «serious».112
The judgement is not as protective as Tele2 and even sets the limit for data access
lower than the now invalid Data Retention Directive (see supra 1.1). In the view
of a Spanish jurist, the Court is «cheating while playing solitary».113 Moreover, the
Courts assumes the conversion of a tool that was introduced for the fight against
terrorism (see supra 1.1), into a tool that might even be used for ordinary offences.
Further, the differentiation on what is and what is not proportional regarding data
access may be problematic.
107Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 October 2018,Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16, para.
49.
108Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 115.
109Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 1(1).
110Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal, C-207/16,
paras. 55 and 57.
111Ibid., paras. 59-63.
112Ibid., para. 56.
113A slightly adapted translation of an idea expressed by Maeztu, David (2018). El Tribunal
de Justicia y la conservación de datos, sentencia "Ministerio Fiscal". Available at: https://
www.derechoynormas.com/2018/10/el-tribunal-de-justicia-y-la.html, visited on
23rd February 2019.
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From a different point of view, the Court may have gained, through this decision,
the power to decide which access is proportional and which is not. Up until the
judgement, Member States could modify their criminal laws and introduce their
concept of «serious crime». Now, the Court, decides (if asked, of course) on what
is and what is not proportional.
What is furthermore interesting about this verdict, is that the CJEU once again
—as in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2— assumes its competence regarding the
access of data: a field, as pointed out earlier (see supra 1.2.3), that may not be EU
competence.
1.3 Conclusion
The decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 draw the following red lines: a
general and indiscriminate data retention scheme is not proportional. Data retention,
however, is possible if it is limited in time and aimed at specific subjects. Further-
more, there must exist an objective nexus between the retention and the investigation
of a crime.
Data must be stored in the European Union and secured by appropriate secur-
ity measures, in order to prevent any illicit use. Access may only be granted to
authorities after judicial (or independent administrative) review.
According to Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 access is only possible for serious
crimes; but theMinisterio Fiscal decision finds that access is also possible for ordin-
ary crimes, if it does not constitute a serious interference with fundamental rights.
This last decision leaves the purpose limitation of the Data Retention Directive be-
hind (intended for serious crimes only) and relies on a, fragile, judicial deliberation
if an interference is serious or not.
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Chapter 2
Beyond theCJEUJurisprudence: What’s
next?
2.1 Legal Framework
2.1.1 Overview
Until May 2018 the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive from 2002
was complementing the Data Protection Directive from 1995,1 thereby trying to
promote data protection and privacy in the era of digital technology.2 In May 2018
the GDPR, the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, entered into
force and repealed the Data Protection Directive from 1995.3
The Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive from 2002 is the most
specific instrument that refers to data retention (see supra 1.2 and article 15 of the
Directive).4 The GDPR provides for a more general framework applicable to data
protection. Also, since 2009 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union guarantees fundamental rights to the citizens of the EU.5
Most importantly, however, the CJEU sets very specific and essential limits for
data retention in its case law, as described in the previous chapter.
All the foregoing, taken as a whole, should be borne in mind when regulating
future forms of data retention in the European Union or in one of its Member States.
1Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
2Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, paras. 82-83.
3Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 94.
4This Directive may be repealed soon by a new Regulation, the ePrivacy Regulation of the EU.
5However, the Charter does apply only to activities comprised by EU law as stated in the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 51.
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2.1.2 GDPR Principles: Purpose, Minimization, Security
TheGDPRprinciples offer a good starting point for analysing possible configurations
of future data retention regulations, as they are at the very centre of the data protection
framework of the EU.
It is, however, unclear if this Regulation is actually applicable to data retention.
Article 2(2) of the GDPR sets out that:
«This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data:
[...] (d) by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the exe-
cution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the
prevention of threats to public security.»
In light of the foregoing, we might actually conclude that the GDPR is not
applicable to data retention. However, Directive 2002/58/EC, includes a similar
exclusion in article 1(3)6 and the CJEU considered this no obstacle for applying
this Directive to data retention (see supra 1.2). Moreover, some of the following
principles did exist prior to the GDPR as well.7 These principles are also explicitly
mentioned in the Directive 2016/680 regulating the «[...]processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection
or prosecution of criminal offences [...]».8, 9 Finally, in light of the CJEU case law,
they may be a relevant part of the fundamental rights enshrined in article 7, «Respect
for private and family life», and 8, «Protection of personal data», of the Charter.10
6«ThisDirective shall not apply to activitieswhich fall outside the scope of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, such as those covered by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European
Union, and in any case to activities concerning public security, defence, State security (including the
economic well-being of the State when the activities relate to State security matters) and the activities
of the State in areas of criminal law.»
7Some principles were already foreseen in 1995, see: Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, art. 6.
8Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: http:
//data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj, visited on 14th April 2019, art. 1(1).
9The list of the GDPR principles is almost identical to the one in art. 4(1) of Directive 2016/680.
10For the effects and the influence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU on a broader
protection of these rights see: Fabbrini, Federico (2015b). “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and the Rights to Data Privacy: The EU Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court”. In: iCourts
Working Paper Series 19. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576214, visited on
13th April 2019, pp. 17-20, 22.
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Therefore, they should be taken into account —at least as informing principles—
independently of the applicability of the GDPR or not.
The first principle to take into account is purpose limitation.11 Retained data
should only be used and treated for a «specified, explicit and legitimate purpose».12
This purpose would depend on any new legislation and its scope of application: in
line with the anterior Data Retention Directive it would concern the investigation of
criminal offences.13
Secondly, the data retained should be minimized (data minimisation) to what
is «adequate, relevant and limited [...] in relation to the purpose».14 Thus, there
should be a nexus between the data retained and the purpose, reducing the data to
be retained accordingly.
In third place, the retained data should allow the identification of the affected
no longer than what is necessary for the purpose of the retention: this principle is
called storage limitation.15
In fourth place, the retained data needs to be stored securely, it should be protected
against «loss, destruction or damage» and «unauthorised or unlawful» access, the
integrity and confidentiality principle.16
Lastly, retained data should be «processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent
manner», without obstructing the purpose of the retention at the same time.17
Article 6(1)(c) of the GDPR, states that processing is lawful in cases of legal
obligation: Obviously, this is the case of data retention imposed by national law, a
new Data Retention Directive or any comparable regulation.
11Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 5(1)(b).
12Ibid., article 5(1)(b).
13Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 1(1).
14Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 5(1)(c).
15Ibid., article 5(1)(e).
16Ibid., article 5(1)(f).
17Ibid., article 5(1)(a).
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2.2 Considerations for the Future of Data Retention
2.2.1 General and Targeted Retention: Objective Nexus
Data retention can basically be carried out in two manners. It can be «general and
indiscriminate»18 as criticised by scholars19 and the case law of the CJEU or it can
be targeted, this is to say that it is actually circumscribed to a certain and determined
group or number of persons.20, 21
Taking into account the decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 it results
clearly that the Court does accept data retention, also if it is preventive, but only if
such a measure complies with certain limitations.22, 23 Retention should only apply
to persons who are linked to the investigation of a criminal offence. This implies
that retention measures should be targeted, usually to persons who are actually
suspicious.24 Targeted retention is less intrusive than «general and indiscriminate»
retention,25 therefore any new data retention regulation should rather be targeted.
Not only should a measure in this sense be targeted, but there ought to be an
objective nexus between a retention measure and a criminal investigation. This it to
say that retention of traffic data about a determined number of persons should only
be permitted, if a suspicion exists that these persons are, directly or indirectly, linked
18Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 103.
19Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, p. 80.
20Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 106.
21The CJEU case law also cites the use of a geographical criterion as an option, which casts some
doubts upon its possible use, see: Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention
in Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”, p. 167.
22Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, paras. 105-106 and 108.
23Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, paras. 57-59.
24Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 166.
25European Data Protection Supervisor (2011). Opinion of the European Data Protection Su-
pervisor on the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC). Available at: https://eur-
lex . europa . eu / legal - content / GA / TXT / ?uri = CELEX : 52011XX0923(01), visited on
7th April 2019, para. 56.
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to the commission of criminal offences.26, 27 The stored data shall not be used for
other unrelated investigations, as this would render the objective nexus requirement
void, useless and leaves the door ajar for possible misuse. Eventually, data retention
is a tool in order to help with ongoing criminal investigations; it should not be a goal
in itself.
Targeted data retention measures might also be used as a preventive investigation
tool, according to the case law of the CJEU.28 If an objective and justifiable reason
exists, this is a valid use case; this preventive usage should in any case be limited
and reviewed externally on a regular basis.
Some may argue that the actual utility of targeted and general retention is not the
same. The first one, targeted retention, is used for the surveillance of a person who is
actually suspicious of having participated in a criminal offence, whereas the second
on, general retention, would not only be used for the investigation of crimes, but also
for the discovery of uncommon communication patterns, which supposedly may
identify future criminals.29, 30 This last argument is neither well founded because
the effectiveness of data retention, in this regard, has not been proven,31, 32 nor well
compatible with the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. It leaves the
distinction of what is and what is not normal, in terms of communication patterns,
in the hands of investigators. Furthermore, it may undermine the presumption of
innocence as it permits to treat everyone as a possible suspect, accumulating his or
her traffic data, even without any evidence about criminal ongoings.33
In this sense, a balanced, proportional data retention system is a targeted one.
26Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, pp. 166-168.
27Exceptionally, data of persons who are not suspected may be retained if this data may effectively
contribute to secure interests such as «vital national security, defence or public security interests»,
see: Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 119.
28Ibid., para. 109.
29Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, pp. 4-5.
30Sarre, Rick (2017). “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised
Crime: A Perspective from Australia”. In: Asian Journal of Criminology 12 (3). issn: 1871-014X.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11417-017-9256-7, visited on 27th November
2018, pp. 172-173.
31Ibid., p. 176.
32Guild and Carrera, “The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the
Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, p. 4.
33For further details on the nexus between retention and investigations, see: Møller Pedersen,
Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”, pp. 166-167.
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2.2.2 Accountability, Oversight and Transparency
In order to guarantee legal security for all implied parties, the following aspects shall
be taken into account.
According to the GDPR principles (see supra 2.1.2), accountability34 shall be
expressly highlighted. Tracing usage, access, storage, protection, integrity and
security of retained data is necessary in order to guarantee compliance with data
retention laws, to facilitate judicial (and/or administrative) control and to ensure the
fulfilment of obligations under data protection laws. Without these organisational
measures to demonstrate how and by whom data has been handled, no control can
be achieved. This obligation shall be applicable to both telecommunication service
providers and to authorities who process the corresponding data, otherwise its utility
would only be partial. In other words, the use of retained data should become clearly
traceable and this usage shall be disclosed to judicial or administrative institutions
if required to do so.
The internal accountability obligation may also stimulate the revision of the
legality of retention orders, either by internal legal supervisors of communication
service providers or by any equivalent institution in law enforcement authorities,
as unlawful processing and disclosure (see supra 2.1.2) shall be avoided.35 Also, it
would be desirable for telecommunication service providers to technically separate
retained data from any other client data: this would contribute to the CJEU case law
requirement of a high standard of security measures.36
Another guarantee, which is absolutely indispensable, is judicial oversight. Data
retention and/or access measures shall always be reviewed by a judicial or an inde-
pendent authority, in order to check if the legality, formal and material requirements,
of the retention and/or access is given.37 This review shall take place prior to the
access to the data by authorities. Ideally a warrant should even be obtained for
issuing a data retention order to a communication service provider, which would,
even if this warrant is not rapidly granted, permit a greater control ex ante.38 Also,
34Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 5(2).
35Ibid., art. 6.
36For the security standard required see: Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data
retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”, p. 169.
37Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 62.
38This would be desirable because any retention measure «constitutes in itself an interference»,
28
2.2. Considerations for the Future of Data Retention
in exceptional cases of validly justified urgency, access to retained data could be
obtained without a prior warrant, but should then be subject to a strict posterior
review.39
Finally, transparency is another fundamental guarantee. Once the investigations,
in which the data retention measure were applied, have concluded, the affected per-
sons shall be notified as soon as possible about this measures. This notification shall
not interfere with the investigations. Through this knowledge of the retention meas-
ures, the affected persons may consider legal remedies.40 More public transparency
would be achieved if law enforcement authorities release periodically and publicly
statistics on the use of data retention measures.
Through these guarantees, a three-step system is designed. Firstly, an internal
control through accountability may avoid misuse in telecommunication service pro-
viders or authorities and partially stimulates the internal revision of retention orders.
Secondly, judicial oversight is an external control that directly assesses legality.
Thirdly, posterior transparency permits the affected persons to take legal actions
or file complaints with the relevant data protection authorities. The collaboration
between an internal supervisor and the external, judicial and administrative, institu-
tions is necessary to increase the effective control.
In this sense, a well balanced and proportional data retention system guarantees
the accountability of retained data usage, strictly requires judicial (or independent)
oversight in all cases and establishes transparency by notifying affected persons.
2.2.3 Storage Period and Erasure
Retained telecommunication traffic data shall not be stored for a generally fixed
period of time, but rather for an individually established time range in each case. This
permits greater respect for individual rights, in light of «what is strictly necessary»,41
and grants flexibility according to the necessity of each case. In any case, amaximum
limit shall exist. According to some opinions a maximum period of one year seems
see: ibid., para. 34.
39Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 120.
40Ibid., para. 122.
41Ibid., para. 108.
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acceptable.42
Once the individually established period has been reached, the retained data
shall be permanently and irreversibly erased by the corresponding communication
service provider.43 Also, if the suspicion ceases to exist the retention measure should
end.44 In both cases: a new retention order for the same person under the same or
a (directly) related criminal investigation shall not be granted, as it would permit to
avoid the set retention period.
2.2.4 Precise and Comprehensive Legislation
Finally, to complywith the standard45 set by the test of proportionality of the CJEU46
some formal requirements should be taken into account.
Legislation, whether of Member States or the European Union, on both retention
and access, should be «clear and precise» and has to contain provisions on circum-
stances and conditions that permit the application of data retention and, as the case
may be, access, ensuring the existence of safeguards for the protection of personal
data of the affected persons.47, 48
Beyond these conditions, legislation shall require that any retention order and any
access to retained data must follow an objective criteria.49 Such an objective criteria
could be the knowledge of the preparation of a criminal offence or the suspicion that
42Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 December 2013, Digital
Rights Ireland, C-293/12 and C-594/12. ECLI:EU:C:2013:845. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1556207084604&uri=CELEX:62012CC0293,
visited on 25th April 2019, paras. 143-149.
43Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 122.
44Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 168.
45About the standard of the test of proportionality in Digital Rights Ireland, see: González
Pascual, “El TJUE como garante de los Derechos en la UE a la luz de la sentencia Digital Rights
Ireland”, pp. 956-958.
46For a clear explanation of the test of proportionality in Digital Rights Ireland, see: Fabbrini,
“Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data Retention Case
and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, pp. 78-81.
47Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, paras. 109 and 117.
48Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 54.
49Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, paras. 110 and 119.
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an individual has committed a crime,50 in the case of ordering a targeted retention
measure; in the case of access to retained data, such a criterion could be that access
has to be solicited for the same reason as the retention was ordered for. Specifically,
access may not necessarily be granted to all the retained data: only to the data
necessary for a determined investigation.51
Furthermore, the relevant legislation should be as comprehensive as possible:
this avoids the distribution of the applicable regulation in different laws and avoids
possible contradictions (see also infra 3.1.1). This measure provides legal security
and certainty.
2.3 Data Preservation or «Quick Freeze»
2.3.1 Introduction
Apractical alternative to conventional data retentionwould be a system that is known
as data preservation or «quick freeze». It is based on a simple presumption: that
data of specific person or group can be retained or stored if there is a suspicion
relating to this person or group.52
Data retention, in comparison, is based on another presumption: that it is ne-
cessary to retain all traffic data in a general manner. This would permit, apart from
investigating committed crimes, to identify atypical activities and to anticipate crim-
inal offences. 53, 54 As already stated, this «general and insdiscriminate»55 retention
does strongly interfere with fundamental rights and is one of the reasons why the
50A concept such as «serious crime» or crimes punished with jail sentences of a certain duration
could be an additional requirement.
51Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 96.
52European Commission (2011). Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament. Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC). Available at:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0225, visited
on 7th April 2019, p. 5.
53Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime: A
Perspective from Australia”, pp. 172-173.
54European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on
the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), paras. 55-56.
55Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 103.
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CJEU declared the Data Retention Directive invalid (see supra 1.2).
Data preservation is neither a new alternative to data retention, nor a new com-
plementary tool, but was already incorporated in the Budapest Convention on Cy-
bercrime of 2001.56, 57 It was also discussed in the institutions of the European
Union before and after adopting the Data Retention Directive: In this sense, the
Data Protection Supervisor 58 and the Article 29 Working Party 59 recommended to
the EU legislators that data preservation would be an alternative to data retention.
However, scholars have hardly discussed data preservation so far.
2.3.2 Principles
As stated, data preservation or «quick freeze» is used for targeted surveillance.
Once a person is suspicious to authorities, these authorities may issue an preserva-
tion order to the corresponding telecommunication service provider, so that future
telecommunication data about the suspicious person is being stored and retained.
This preservation order obliges the telecommunication service provider to store the
requested data for a certain period of time.60
In order to gain access to this data, a judicial warrant would be necessary.61, 62
56Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention). Available at: https://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full- list/- /conventions/rms/0900001680081561, visited on
7th April 2019, art. 16.
57Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (European Commission) and Centre for
Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES) (2013). Evidence of potential impacts of options for
revising the Data Retention Directive: Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and
in third countries. Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/5dc1b779-1a1c-4e53-a17f-1fd0fe71e4ad, visited on 7th April
2019, p. 5.
58European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on
the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), para. 57.
59Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2005). Opinion 4/2005. Available at: https:
//ec.europa.eu/justice/article- 29/documentation/opinion- recommendation/
index_en.htm#maincontentSec13, visited on 7th April 2019, p. 6.
60Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (European Commission) and Centre for
Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES), Evidence of potential impacts of options for revising the
Data Retention Directive: Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and in third countries,
p. 5.
61European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on
the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), para. 54.
62See also Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige,
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Alternatively, judicial review could also be envisioned prior to the preservation order
(see supra 2.2.2); however, this may be impractical.
It is unclear whether data preservation should only apply to traffic data, as indic-
ated by the European Data Protection Supervisor,63 or if it could apply to commu-
nication content too, as is the case with the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.64
It is save to assume, in any case, that the storage or retention of communication
content may affect various fundamental rights essentially.65
Two different models of data preservation are being discussed: «quick freeze»
and «quick freeze plus». In the «quick freeze» model data would only be stored
from the moment of the preservation order. In the «quick freeze plus» model the
telecommunication service provider would additionally retain (and give access to, if
a judicial authorisation is obtained) the data it has stored for any legitimate purposes
(i.e. billing or advertisement).66
2.3.3 Guarantees: Access Logs and Judicial Review
In order to ensure compliance with fundamental rights, internal and external guar-
antees should be considered and established (see supra 2.2.2).
Internal guarantees affect the telecommunication service providers, who are
obliged to retain or store data, and authorities. These guarantees shall, following
the underlying principles of the GDPR, establish accountability.67 This is to say,
that it should be possible to trace the usage of the affected data and the compliance
with the relevant principles (see supra 2.2.2). As a practical idea, already proposed
by the Article 29 Working Party, access logs should be established, stating who,
C-203/15 and C-698/15, para. 120.
63European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on
the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), para. 54.
64Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (European Commission) and Centre for
Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES), Evidence of potential impacts of options for revising the
Data Retention Directive: Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and in third countries,
p. 8.
65See in this regard: Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2
Sverige, C-203/15 and C-698/15, para. 101.
66European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment. Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), p. 6.
67Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 5(2).
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when and for which purpose had access to the data.68 These logs shall be made
available to judicial and data protection authorities upon request.69 Internal access
should be limited to a certain number of authorized persons70 and any usage of
the data other than for the purpose set out in the legislation should be illegitimate
(i.e. access by unrelated third parties).71, 72 Moreover, an internal legal supervisor
could be established, in order to check the legality of preservation orders and access
requests.
External guarantees affect the access of authorities to the retained or stored data.
As stated in theDigital Rights Ireland and the Tele2 case, prior judicial authorisation
(or prior review by an independent administrative body) is necessary for access to
the retained data.73, 74 This judicial oversight is also remarked by authors like Ryan,
stating its importance in relevant decision on data retention.75 This authorisation
may only be granted if specific conditions, such as a plausible suspicion, a threat or
other objective criteria, are met.76
Both guarantees are complemented by another instrument, which is mandatory
according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: oversight by the com-
petent data protection authority.77 This is also an issue addressed by the CJEU,
stating expressly that the intervention of said authorities only applies if a complaint
is lodged, making it therefore an optional guarantee.78 Keep in mind that compli-
ance with the applicable legislation can not be demonstrated if there is no internal
68Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2005, p. 8.
69Ibid., p. 8.
70Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 62.
71See the purpose limitation principle in: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, art. 5(1)(b).
72Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2005, pp. 8-10.
73Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 120.
74Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 62.
75Ryan, Michael (2016). “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are
addressing the issue of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”. In: TPRC 44: The
44th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy 2016. Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742057, visited on 7th April 2019, p. 20.
76Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, pp. 168-169.
77Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8(3).
78Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 123.
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accountability regarding the processing of the retained data.
2.3.4 Critical Aspects
Data preservation does in fact share a lot of critical aspects with data retention as
declared invalid by the CJEU (see supra 1.2).
Firstly, problems relating to access to the retained or stored data are equally
valid for both data preservation and data retention: there is no objective difference
between the data stored in oneway or another, when it comes to access by authorities.
Legislation on this subject —access— must be «clear and precise» and has to
contain provisions on «substantive and procedural conditions» that permit access
to the data.79 Access may only be granted according to objective criteria and prior
independent oversight (i.e. judicial review) must be assured.80 Furthermore, the
affected shall be notified, after the access to the retained data (or after the retention
without access) by the competent authorities, but only from the moment when this
notification will not affect ongoing investigations anymore.81, 82
Secondly, data security measures are applicable in the same way to data retention
as to data preservation: data must be stored in the EU, secured with «appropriate
technical and organizational measures» and must be irreversibly destroyed once the
storage period has ended.83
Lastly, what differentiates data retention from data preservation is the reason of
the retention. Data retention is general and affects virtually everyone without any
particular reason, whereas data preservation is targeted retention of communication
data because of a particular reason (see supra 2.2.1). However, data preservation
may affect, depending on the implementation, both content and traffic data: espe-
cially the retention of content data could be critical taking into account the CJEU
decisions.84, 85
79Ibid., paras. 117-118.
80Ibid., paras. 119-120.
81Ibid., para. 121.
82Fennelly, “Data retention: the life, death and afterlife of a directive”, p. 15.
83Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 122.
84Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 165.
85Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 101.
35
2.3. Data Preservation or «Quick Freeze»
Sure enough, data preservation is not perfect and may be abused (as well as
any other governmental power), but it establishes, at least, a link between a specific
investigation based on a suspicion, on one hand, and a surveillance measure, on the
other. It is therefore compatible with the «objective evidence», between a criminal
offence and the affected public, that could justify data retention according to the
CJEU.86, 87
86Ibid., paras. 110-111.
87It must be «possible to create a link between the persons whose data are retained and the
prevention of or fight against serious crime» according to: Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld
Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”, pp. 166-167.
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Chapter 3
Alternative Systems and Lessons for
Data Retention in the EU
In this chapter various data retention systems in different jurisdictions will be ana-
lysed in light of the foregoing guarantees and considerations. We will firstly treat
two flawed systems and secondly two balanced, rather proportional ones. Both
categories permit to draw conclusions for future regulation and analysis of the topic.
3.1 Flawed Data Retention Systems
3.1.1 Access to Telecommunication Data in the United States
The approach to data retention in the United States (US) is very different from the
European one discussed above.
Firstly, there is no general, comprehensive regulation concerning data retention
of telecommunication data.1 Secondly, the difference between content and traffic
data (see supra 1.1) is of utmost importance for constitutional protection.2 Thirdly,
the intervention of third parties implies important restrictions for the expectation of
privacy regarding telecommunication data.3
Access to data, either content of traffic data, is not regulated in one single act. It
is partially covered by the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution,4 as long as a
1Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, p. 17.
2Fura, Elisabet and Klamberg, Mark (2012). “The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Meas-
ures: A Comparative Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA”. in: Freedom
of Expression – Essays in honour of Nicolas Bratza – President of the European Court of Human
Rights. Ed. by Casadevall, Josep, Myjer, Egbert and O’Boyle, Michael. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal
Publishers. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2169894, visited on 27th November
2018, p. 477.
3Ibid., pp. 476-477.
4«The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported byOath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.» according to: Constitution of the United States. Available
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conduct constitutes a «search». Traffic data, however, is not covered by the Fourth
Amendment, as expressed by scholars, whereas content data does in fact receive this
protection.5
Moreover, the case law of the US Supreme Court established what is known as
the third party doctrine: if a third party has access to data the subject concerned
loses its rights of protection granted by the US Constitution. «In other words, by
disclosing information to a third party such as a bank or a CSP [communication
service provider], the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the
information revealed, including data retained in a database or an information net-
work.»6 Commonly, telecommunication providers in the United States already store
traffic data for «marketing purposes», which facilitates the use by law enforcement
authorities.7
This does not mean that no protection or regulation is offered for traffic data.
«Electronic surveillance law in the United States is comprised primarily of two
statutory regimes: (1) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which
is designed to regulate domestic surveillance; and (2) the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which is designed to regulate foreign intelligence
gathering.»8 Generally speaking the ECPA offers a higher level of protection than
the FISA. Specifically in reference to traffic data retention, some other legislative
measures9 require the authorities to obtain court orders.10
Even though someActs may grant regulation and protection to traffic and content
data, in practice the National Security Agency is creating important databases con-
cerning this data, warrantlessly. There seems to be a divergence between the powers
foreseen by the ECPA/FISA and the powers conferred to the President by virtue
of the legislation enacted in response to the fall of the twin towers in September
at: https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm, visited on
3rd November 2018.
5Fura and Klamberg, “The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Comparative
Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA”, pp. 476-477.
6Ibid., p. 476.
7Bignami, Francesca (2007b). “Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The
Data Retention Directive”. In: Chicago Journal of International Law 8 (1). Available at: https:
//ssrn.com/abstract=955261, visited on 27th November 2018, p. 238.
8Fura and Klamberg, “The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Comparative
Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA”, p. 478.
9The Pen Register statute and the Stored Communications Act according to: ibid., p. 479.
10Ibid., pp. 478-479.
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2001. In some cases of surveillance (measures) it remains unclear which legislation
is applicable.11
Public and Private Institutions
It is important to stress the difference between data retention by telecommunication
service providers, which is indirect and retention directly executed by law enforce-
ment authorities. The latter, as stated above and in accordance with the Snowden
revelations,12 is common practice in the US; this does not imply that authorities
would not rely on indirectmeasures, too.13 This double dimension, especially visible
in the context of the United States, raises the question if a comprehensive regulation
should regulate retention and access for both public and private institutions.
In light of the CJEU case law
From the CJEU case law perspective and taking into account the ideas discussed up
until now, the United States data retention regulation lacks essential safeguards.
Firstly, no comprehensive and clear legal framework is given for data retention
of traffic data. This does interfere fundamentally with the principle of legal security.
Not all retention activities are judicially (or independently) overseen, depriving
citizens therefore of a basic safeguard and protection.
There seems to be little transparency or accountability regarding the interference
with the private lifes of the population by law enforcement authorities or by tele-
communication service providers. Without transparency, control is hardly possible.
Also, retention is not targeted but is affecting the general public, without any
(known) objective criteria relating to criminal offences that are being investigated.
Bignami already stated in 2007 that some practices which are common in the US
would be «clearly illegal in Europe»,14 an opinionwhich seems to bewell anticipated
11Ibid., pp. 479-481.
12Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, p. 89.
13Fura and Klamberg, “The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Comparative
Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA”, pp. 468-469.
14Bignami, Francesca (2007a). “European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining”. In: Bosten College Law Review 48 (3). Available at:
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol48/iss3/3/, visited on 26th April 2019,
p. 635.
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in light of the posterior CJEU case law.
3.1.2 Retention in Australia
Australia has a general data retention regulation, enacted in 2015. It provides for
a data retention system that affects traffic data of all telecommunication service
providers for two years.15
This data may be accessed by law enforcement authorities without a judicial
warrant nor any other comparable, external and independent, oversight, except for
journalists.16 However, the Commonwealth Ombusdman should «assess agency
compliance».17 It was discussed if the retained data could be used for civil proceed-
ings, but finally this civil usage was discarded.18, 19
According to scholars, the data retained in observance of this legislation has
been widely used since its entry into force. The most investigated offences were
drug-related,20 even though retention measures are often justified as anti-terrorism
measures.21
The Australian data retention legislation has not been spared from criticism;
it is considered excessive and the lack of safeguards has been pointed out.22, 23
Also, as a specific Australian characteristic, the absence of a Bill of Rights or a
fundamental rights framework has been stressed: other than in most European states,
for example, there is no constitutional (or supranational) control possible.24, 25 This
reveals the importance and discretion of the legislator, which is not directly limited
15Meares, Michelle (2018). “Mass Surveillance and Data Retention in Australia: Balancing
Rights and Freedoms”. In: Journal of Internet Law 21 (10). issn: 1094-2904, p. 3.
16Ibid., p. 3.
17Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime: A
Perspective from Australia”, p. 171.
18Ibid., p. 171.
19Meares, “Mass Surveillance and Data Retention in Australia: Balancing Rights and Freedoms”,
p. 4.
20Ibid., p. 4.
21Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime: A
Perspective from Australia”, pp. 172-173.
22Ibid., pp. 173-176.
23Meares, “Mass Surveillance and Data Retention in Australia: Balancing Rights and Freedoms”,
p. 3.
24Ibid., p. 5.
25Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime: A
Perspective from Australia”, p. 175.
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by fundamental rights. It is, in this case, essentially for the legislator to balance
the surveillance power conferred to law enforcement authorities and liberties in a
democratic society.
From a European Union perspective, the Australian data retention regulation
lacks necessary safeguards. AsMeares points out, theAustralian regulationwould be
most probably «considered general and indiscriminate».26 Furthermore, no judicial
(or independent) oversight is guaranteed, except for journalists: access is therefore
arbitrarily possible.
This highly intrusive regulation also permits to emphasize the necessity of ef-
fective safeguards. Even though the Australian data retention regulation offers
protection to journalists (in their condition as an essential part of any critical demo-
cratic society) establishing that law enforcement authorities need to obtain a warrant
for access to their traffic data, it became known that these authorities also obtained
such data without a warrant.27, 28 Eventually, this shows different problems: in the
first place, that it should not be exclusively for authorities to determine if they have
access or not to sensitive datasets. As the case shows, these powers may be mis-
used. In the second place, that an telecommunication service provider should be,
at least, diligent when it comes to collaboration with law enforcement. This is to
say that if the law grants special protection to journalists, a partial responsibility of
compliance with this legal standard corresponds to the telecommunication service
providers, too.29 In the third place, and most importantly, that safeguards need to
be logically interlinked and connected in order to prevent abuse. If law is granting
a special treatment to journalists, this legal protection should be effectively ensured
by a logical design (see supra 2.2.2).30
26Meares, “Mass Surveillance and Data Retention in Australia: Balancing Rights and Freedoms”,
p. 5.
27Ibid., p. 3.
28Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime: A
Perspective from Australia”, p. 175.
29Service providers should prevent «unauthorized interference and access» according to: Meares,
“Mass Surveillance and Data Retention in Australia: Balancing Rights and Freedoms”, p. 3.
30Sarre writes, in this context, that «the ease with which the access was obtained should remain
a matter of concern», see: Sarre, “Metadata Retention as a Means of Combatting Terrorism and
Organised Crime: A Perspective from Australia”, p. 175.
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3.2 Balanced Data Retention Systems
3.2.1 The Austrian Data Preservation System
Austrias data retention system is similar to the data preservation approach explained
above (see supra 2.3).
After the Digital Rights Ireland decision the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof
(Constitutional Court) stroke down the national data retention regime31, 32 and
subsequently law enforcement authorities had less legal options for investigating
criminal offences through technological means.
Alternatives were discussed and disputed afterwards, but it was not until 2018
that the government proposed and the parliament approved of the so-called Sicher-
heitspaket («Security Package») or, as named by its critics, the Überwachungspaket
(«Surveillance Package»).33 Included in this legislative package a new data pre-
servation regime was defined and called Anlassdatenspeicherung (literally «data
retention for a reason»).34
It enables law enforcement authorities, in this case the public prosecutor’s office,
to order communication service providers to retain data (traffic data, location data
and access data) of a specific subject or subjects.35 This order may be issued once
a an initial suspicion, that a crime has been committed,36 exists.37 Moreover, it
is necessary that the wilful offence being investigated is at least punished with a
six month jail sentence, if the owner of device affected by the retention measure
consents, or else with a one year jail sentence,38 among other possible use cases.
31Fabbrini, “Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States”, p. 88.
32Verfassungsgerichtshof, 27th June 2014, G47/2012. Available at: https://www.vfgh.gv.
at/downloads/VfGH_G_47-2012_ua_VDS_schriftliche_Entscheidung.pdf, visited on
25th April 2019.
33Adensamer, Angelika and Hanel, Alina (2018). “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”. In:
juridikum 3. issn: 2309-7477, p. 292.
34Ibid., p. 296.
35Ibid., p. 296.
36Strafprozeßordnung 1975 (StPO). Available at: https : / / www . ris . bka . gv . at /
GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002326, visited on
25th April 2019, § 1(1).
37Ibid., § 135(2b).
38Being the latter option the most probable case, see: Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachung-
spaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
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The relevant data has to be stored for a period as long as necessary to fulfil its
purpose, not exceeding twelve months in any case.39 In order to gain access to the
retained data, the public prosecutors office needs a warrant form a judicial institution
who controls the legality of the retention order issued,40 although this is not stated
with absolute clarity in the relevant articles.41, 42 It is noteworthy that the affected
of the surveillance measures are going to be notified once this information will not
jeopardize ongoing and related investigations anymore.43
Criticism
Scholars criticize the excessive length of the retention (or preservation) of data,
stating that it is likely that data of communication activities of up to a year would
have similarities with the system of the Data Retention Directive. Adensamer and
Hanel expressly remark that the datawhich is temporally unlinked (i.e. data collected
long before or long after) to the reason of the preservation, foreseen in the current
Austrian legislation, may be colliding with fundamental rights as it resembles more
a general data retention than a targeted one.44 It must be said, however, that the
Austrian legislation sets twelve months as a maximum, not as a minimum or a
standard.45 This is in line with the opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón
who stated that data retention for more than a year would hardly be proportional.46, 47
Moreover, it is criticised that a judicial warrant is not necessary until the actual
access to the retained data is solicited. The legislators claim that this is according
39Strafprozeßordnung 1975 (StPO), § 137(3).
40Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
41Strafprozeßordnung 1975 (StPO), §§ 134-140.
42Rom writes that the new regulation only regulates the preservation or retention of data. To
access this data it is necessary to comply with the same standards as foreseen for other datasets,
meaning that a judicial authorization is necessary. See: Rom, Brigitte (2018). “Neuerungen im
Strafverfahren - das Strafprozessrechtsänderungsgesetz 2018”. In: Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung
17. issn: 0029-9251, p. 764.
43Strafprozeßordnung 1975 (StPO), § 138(5).
44Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
45Rom, “Neuerungen im Strafverfahren - das Strafprozessrechtsänderungsgesetz 2018”, p. 764.
46Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 December 2013, Digital Rights
Ireland, C-293/12 and C-594/12, para. 150.
47Most data is accessed within the first three months according to Guild and Carrera, “The
Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention
Directive”, p. 14.
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to CJEU jurisprudence.48 However, it is unclear if this is the case because the
CJEU states that retention (without access) also interferes with fundamental rights:49
on one hand data retention itself does interfere with the rights of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union; on the other hand control exists, but
posterior to the retention. In any case, judicial oversight is mandatory and must take
place prior to access to data by authorities.50
Even though the GDPR is of direct application in the whole European Union
and grants a minimum of standards to comply with, the Austrian data preservation
legislation does not establish any additional safeguards. This might be critical
because both Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 insist on the specific requirements
that data storage must meet in this context.51, 52
Furthermore, a very valid point of criticism is the lack of details regarding the
nexus between the initial suspicion and the following data retention or preservation. 53
This nexus between an offence and an investigation measure must exist and is
essential for proportionality (see supra 2.2.1).54 The Austrian regulation does not
cover this requirement adequately as it does not establish limitations on the use
of the accumulated data by the retention measures: even though in other cases
of surveillance the Austrian legislation enshrines the exclusion of evidence, in the
case of the Anlassdatenspeicherung even unrelated evidence obtained by accidental
discoverymight be used afterwards. This implies that retained data is not necessarily
used for the investigation of the initial suspicion.55
48Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
49Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, para. 34.
50Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige, C-203/15 and
C-698/15, para. 120.
51Ibid., para. 122.
52Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12
and C-594/12, paras. 66-68.
53Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
54Møller Pedersen, Udsen and Sandfeld Jakobsen, “Data retention in Europe—the Tele 2 case
and beyond”, p. 166.
55Adensamer and Hanel, “Das Überwachungspaket im Überblick”, p. 296.
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3.2.2 Data Retention in Canada
In Canada there is no general data retention legislation in force. 56 However, case
law gives us a general understanding on how the issue is handled and interpreted.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as a part of the Canadian
Constitution, guarantees «[...]the right to be secure against unreasonably search and
seizure».57According toRyan this has been interpreted by the courts as a «reasonable
expectation of privacy»; a search is only admissible if it is foreseen by law 58 and
once «(1) a prior warrant, (2) issued by a judicial or other impartial arbiter, (3) on a
sworn showing of reasonable and probable cause»59 is obtained.
Similar to the questions arising from the US Constitution, the definition of what
constitutes a «search» and what does not is essential to determine the applicable
legislation.
The importance of case law in Canada
This question has been addressed in the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada.
After the judgement inR. v. Spencer 60 it was clear that even the request for subscriber
information, voluntarily complied with by a telecommunication service provider,
was qualified as a search. Even though the contract with the telecommunication
service provider included a clause stating its collaboration with law enforcement,
the court ruled that «disclosure was permissible only if required or permitted by
law, and that compliance with the particular police request was neither required nor
permitted by Canadian privacy laws. The search was therefore illegal.»61, 62
56Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, p. 17.
57Constitution Act, 1982. Available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/
page-15.html, visited on 26th April 2019, section 8.
58Ibid., section 1.
59Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, p. 17.
60R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43. Available at: https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/14233/index.do?r=AAAAAQAHc3BlbmNlcgE, visited on 29th April 2019.
61Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, p. 18.
62For the importance of R. v. Spencer and more context see: Penney, Steven (2014). “The
Digitization of Section 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution?” In: The SupremeCourt LawReview:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 67. Available at: https://digitalcommons.
osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol67/iss1/16/, visited on 29th April 2019, pp. 521-533.
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Later, in R. v. Roger Communications63 it was held that «tower dumps», identi-
fying all phone connections and the correspondent subscriber data of a cell phone
tower, are not adequate to single out a «few individuals», which are being invest-
igated for a criminal offence.64 Intrusion should be minimized and therefore bulk
retention is only possible if certain standards are met. The application of such a
measure must take the principle of minimal intrusion into account and the applic-
ants must justify the retention of data of certain cell towers (time, location and
other possible data) in light of an investigation and explain why a certain data type
(i.e. credit card information, names) is relevant; they must in addition provide for
any information that may allow to reduce the retention measure to less individuals;
also, a request for a report about the stored data shall be made and only in justified
cases should the relevant «underlying data» made available to the authorities, who
furthermore have to justify that this data can be interpreted and used.65
Conclusions from a European Perspective
Canadian case law offers, in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, a balanced protection of rights and access to data by law enforcement
authorities. The scope of application of what constitutes a «search» is relatively
broad and does therefore offer protection even if data requested would be subscriber
information (compare withMinisterio Fiscal supra 1.2 and constitutional protection
in the US supra 3.1.1); this constitutional framework does grant an initial and
fundamental safeguard, as it explicitly requires an independent warrant. Also the
intrusion in the sphere of privacy should always be reduced to an minimum, which
is comparable to the requirement of proportionality or necessity66 in CJEU case law.
It remains unclear if principals, such as transparency and accountability, are
somehow applicable; time will tell if legislative measures, in this sense, will be
taken or judicial decisions arise. Even though, the Canadian legal framework does
not necessarily reflect all possible guarantees for data retention discussed in the
63R. v. Rogers Communications, 2016 ONSC 70. Available at: https://www.canlii.org/
en/on/onsc/doc/2016/2016onsc70/2016onsc70.html, visited on 29th April 2019.
64Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, p. 19.
65R. v. Rogers Communications, 2016 ONSC 70, para. 65.
66Ryan, “Persona non data: How the Courts in the EU, UK and Canada are addressing the issue
of communications data surveillance vs. privacy rights”, pp. 20-21.
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European Union (see supra 2.2), data retention is treated as a sensitive topic in
Canadian case law.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Answers to the Research Questions
How is data retention and access to retained data shaped and conditioned by the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union?
The Court of Justice of the European Union strictly reviewed the Data Retention
Directive in Digital Rights Ireland. It found that the Directive is in breach of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion, especially article 7 and 8: the
rights to respect for private and family life and protection of personal data. Hence,
the Directive was declared invalid. Two years later in Tele2 the Court concluded
that national legislation with similar traits is not compatible with European Union
Law neither.
Both decision make a distinction between data retention and access to this re-
tained data. Even so, both constitute an interference with the rights concerned. On
one hand, the retention of data without any differentiation, «general and indiscrim-
inate», is not proportional. It exposes the population to «constant surveillance»
because there is no objective link between a suspicious criminal activity and the
retention of telecommunication data. On the other hand, access and storage did
not fulfil necessary safeguards: a prior judicial (or independent) authorisation is
necessary for access, data must be stored with particularly high security measures,
in the European Union, and the access conditions should be clearly identified by law.
The CJEU does not rule out data retention in general, but, taking into account
both cases, it sets important limitations in order to protect fundamental rights at
stake.
InMinisterio Fiscal the CJEU finds that access to retained data might be possible
even for ordinary criminal offences, if the data access by law enforcement is not
considered to be a serious interference with fundamental rights. This leaves the door
open for extending the initial purpose of data retention, the investigation of serious
crimes, to all criminal offences.
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Beyond the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and
the applicable legal framework: which options and models for data retention and
access are plausible?
The current legislation in force which is directly focussed on data retention
in the European Union is only one article of the 2002 Privacy and Electronic
Communications Directive. This regulation is completed by the GDPR and the
principles defined therein. It is argued that these principles should at least inform
new legislation and the relevant legal framework on data retention.
In order to design a data retention scheme in line with the CJEU case law, some
initial considerations are necessary. Firstly, data retention should be targeted and
not general. This targeted retention has to be justified by an objective reason, such
as a suspicion.
Secondly, law enforcement authorities and telecommunication service providers
should be able to demonstrate accountability regarding the processing of the retained
data. This is necessary so as to assist a judicial (or independent administrative)
institution with its decision in regard to the authorisation of a targeted data retention
measure or, as the case may be, access to the data retained. Also, the individuals
affected of data retention shall be notified by the authorities; if necessary they can
seek legal remedies regarding their surveillance. This provides for a three-step
system in which law enforcement and communication service providers cooperate
with judicial and/or administrative institutions in order to make informed decisions.
Thirdly, data should be retained according to a time period set individually in each
case. Legislation should provide formaximum, in any case. Further, communication
service providers should be obliged to permanently delete the stored data.
Finally, legislation should be understandable, precise and as comprehensive as
possible, in order to ensure legal security. Also, an objective criteria should be
required for any retention measure to be ordered and for soliciting access to data.
Data preservation is a practical solution that would satisfy some of the points
stated beforehand. Communication service providers would retain data only if they
are ordered to do so by law enforcement on an individual basis. It is, therefore, a
form of targeted retention upon suspicion, which together with additional guaran-
tees, such as access logs, may well adapt to the CJEU case law requirements. As
critical aspects, questions regarding the access to the stored data and its security
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remain important.
Have any of the suggested options for question two or any alternative system
proved anywhere to fulfil the principle of proportionality and to respect fundamental
rights?
As a result of the jurisdictions and the corresponding legislations discussed,
two data retention systems could be described as flawed. Whereas, two are more
balanced, rather proportional and respectful of fundamental rights.
TheUnited States and theAustralian data retention systemwould not complywith
the standards set out earlier. In the case of Australia the answer is straightforward,
because the data retention system in place is of a general nature and facilitates law
enforcement access to the retained data without any judicial oversight. Furthermore,
the case of Australia gives us good reasons to design logically connected guarantees
which complement each other, because even journalists, especially protected by the
Australian legislation, had their data retained and accessed without the necessary
warrants. Regarding the situation in the United States it must be said that the
regulation does not provide a high level of legal security. This is so because different
statutes may be applicable to traffic data retention, differentiating, i.e., international
and internal scenarios; moreover, as a consequence of anti-terrorism legislation
extensive surveillance programs (of content and traffic data) have been establish,
even though their legality is unclear. This scattered legislation does not provide for
sufficient legal security; additionally, some surveillance measures carried out in the
United States would most probably be illegal under European Union laws.
The Canadian and the Austrian approach to data retention seem to be more
respectful of fundamental rights. In the case of Canada, it has to be said that
no comprehensive legal regulation exists, but this void is partially filled with the
resulting case law from the constitutional protection of privacy. Obtaining subscriber
information of the client of a telecommunication service provider requires a judicial
warrant under the Canadian Constitution; an intrusion in the private sphere of an
individual should then be reduced to a minimum and practical guidance is given
on how to reduce the impact of such an intrusion in specific cases. Data retention
and privacy are treated as sensitive topics, although questions regarding additional
guarantees remain to be answered. The Austrian approach is directly linked to
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the CJEU case law and the applicable legislation provides for a data preservation
system: data must be retained by a telecommunication service provider once an
corresponding order has been issued by law enforcement. This order may be granted
for the investigation of determined wilfully committed criminal offences and data
can be stored for up to twelve months. A judicial warrant is necessary for access to
the data by law enforcement. The most critical point is the posterior usage of the
retained data as this usage is not necessary limited to the initial suspicion. Therefore,
this data may be (re)-used in another context, unlinked to the initial reason of the
retention.
4.2 Questions for the Future
Important questions remain to be answered in the future regarding data retention.
They might as well be considered in a broader context, especially taking into ac-
count the influence of new technological solutions for the investigations of criminal
offences.
Telecommunication data retention is only one of many forms of data retention:
Other schemes operate in the European Union, for example the passenger name
record (PNR) data directive. It is probable that the findings in relation with tele-
communication data might be valuable for the study of these retention schemes. In
any case, future investigation on other data retention schemes is necessary in order
to assess them regarding their proportionality.
Another important taskwould be to study the purpose limitation of data retention.
If it was initially conceived for the fight against serious criminal offences, this
initial purpose may have become less relevant after the Ministerio Fiscal decision.
Therefore, the modification of the purpose of retention measures should be followed
up on. Possible mission creeps of technological investigation tools have, most
probably, a big repercussion for fundamental rights.
Moreover, from a comprehensive perspective, it should be further explored if
and how access to sensitive telecommunication data by law enforcement affects data
retained for private purposes, such as billing or advertisement. In other words, if
any data retention regulation may also be applicable to data withheld in accordance
with a contractual agreement between private parties or if this data is available to
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law enforcement in other ways. In light of the foregoing the international access
to data stored by private companies in other states and/or jurisdictions may be an
interesting issue.
Finally, the future ePrivacy regulation of the European Union, still not approved
of at the time of writing, may change the applicable legal framework. It is, in this
sense, important to evaluate the modifications that this regulation may, eventually,
bring about. Considering this possible impact, the influence and applicability of the
GDPR should also be reconsidered.
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